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Between Resistance and the State: Caribbean Activism and the Invention of a National 
Memory of Slavery in France
Abstract: Between 1998 and 2006, the memory of slavery in France developed from a 
marginalized issue into a priority of the state. This article examines the process in which 
community activists and state actors interacted with and against one another to integrate 
remembrance and the commemoration of slavery and its abolitions into a Republican national 
narrative. It focuses on a series of actions from the protests against the 150th anniversary of the 
abolition of slavery in 1998 to the creation of the 10 May National Memorial Day to Slavery 
and Its Abolitions in 2006. Basing its analysis on oral-history interviews and various 
publications, this article argues that “memory activists” – and particularly new anti-racist 
groups – mobilized the memory of slavery to address issues of community identity and 
resistance within the context of 21st-century Republicanism. In so doing, they articulated a new 
kind of black identity in France.
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Article:
In June 2014, the newly appointed President of the Comité National pour la Mémoire et 
l’Histoire de l’Esclavage (CNMHE), Myriam Cottias, spoke about the organization’s history 
and future plans in an oral history interview. For her, one of the most pressing goals of this 
state organization was to direct the growing interest in the commemoration of the history of 
slavery away from the “simplification […] of memory” to the “complexity of history”. She 
believed that “cette phase de la mémoire s’est achevée et les gens maintenant veulent de 
l’histoire. Il faut bien aussi que ça se normalise”.1 This view represented a growing concern of 
French state actors that the recent politicization of memory – and the memory of slavery in 
particular – had fractured French society and given too much space for particular group 
identities. Indeed, from the late 1990s into the 2000s, the struggles of Caribbean activists turned 
the national conversation toward France’s involvement in the enslavement of Africans. The 
development of a memory culture about slavery2 was thus (re-)becoming a defining feature of 
the relationship between the French state and African-heritage communities living in the 
héxagone.3
This article examines the national debate and increased politicization of the memory of the 
slave trade in French public discourse. In particular, it will explore how grassroots associations 
and state actors interacted to integrate the memory of slavery and its abolitions into France’s 
national postcolonial narrative through a series of actions from the protests against the 150th 
anniversary of the abolition of slavery in 1998 to the creation of the 10 May National Memorial 
Day to Slavery and Its Abolitions in 2006. It studies these interactions within the context of the 
emergence of a new type of “memory activism” in France, where new activist groups focused 
their struggle on achieving official state recognition of their particular narratives. In so doing, 
they redefined the meaning of community identity and resistance within the context of 21st-
century Republicanism. This particular case will explore the way new anti-racist groups 
mobilized the memory of slavery to articulate a new kind of black identity in France.
In this context, this article complements the growth in scholarly attention to the challenges and 
contradictions of present-day French Republicanism in its multi-ethnic, postcolonial 
circumstance. Its focus on the struggles of African-heritage activists to commemorate slavery 
on a national level highlights two main Republican fault-lines. Firstly, it examines the conflicts 
that arise from the Republican concentration on supposedly color-blind national cohesion and 
its antithesis of communautarisme. Secondly, it addresses the peculiar role of memory in the 
contestation of contemporary identities in France. As activists struggled for acknowledgement 
of their particular narratives, they often found it impossible to reconcile the contradiction 
between the goal of resisting state monopoly and the desire for state recognition. 
Even before the 1990s, the history of enslavement had weighed heavily over the relationship 
between the French state and its overseas territories, particularly the overseas departments 
(DOMs) of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Reunion Island and French Guyana. From the era of 
plantation slavery to abolition and the post-abolitionist transition into other forms of colonial 
domination, slavery and its legacies could not be disentangled from the attachment of these 
dependencies to France. Myriam Cottias argues that a state-induced mechanism of silence 
facilitated their continued entanglement. This “politics of silence” had been implemented in 
the metropole and the colonies alike to turn the page and “move on” from the founding event 
of enslavement.4 
In the DOMs, this silence informed an abolitionist narrative, where state-sponsored celebration 
of abolition and the figure of Victor Schoelcher, “the father of abolition”, became 
omnipresent.5 From the 1920s into the 1960s, Pan-African activists, and in particular Aimé 
Césaire and the négritude movement, challenged this view within a broader struggle for 
independence. In this context, Edouard Glissant’s work was key in raising Caribbean 
consciousness and challenging Schoelcherism. However, after decolonization and 
departmentalization, anti-colonial struggles were slowly abandoned in favour of politics of 
development.6 Meanwhile, issues relevant to the DOMs – such as extreme poverty, staggering 
inequality and endemic unemployment – remained out of sight of hexagonal society.7 Yet even 
as the legacies of slavery informed certain Antillean independentist8 movements, including 
independentist activists in the metropole,9 the abolitionist discourse in the DOMs was further 
reinforced by the Mitterrand government’s decree from 1983. It fixed the date of the abolition 
of slavery as a public holiday in the DOMs and instructed schools in both the DOMs and the 
héxagone to dedicate an hour every 27 April to studying France’s abolitions.10 Whereas schools 
in the héxagone have rarely been made aware of this decree in order to implement it, this 
tradition has been respected in the DOMs.11 
Simultaneously, while intellectuals and political activists in the DOMs challenged the 
abolitionist discourse on a local level, national preoccupation with the legacies of slavery 
remained minimal. Nonetheless, it depended on changes in the nature of domien political 
engagement with the hexagon. In particular, from the 1960s onwards, the growing ultramarin 
population in the hexagon sought a voice both through political representation and grassroots 
activism. These initially focused on two different goals. On the one hand, young activists took 
advantage of their French nationality to improve the conditions of their constituencies in the 
hexagon, both through alliances with trade unions and involvement with nascent French anti-
racism.12 This group did not evoke the memory of slavery. They perceived it as either irrelevant 
for their struggles or potentially pernicious, as it could alienate white allies. On the other hand, 
Paris became the home of radical independentist activists, who sought to challenge the political 
status quo. Despite drawing on references such as Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism, 
Edouard Glissant’s growing body of work or drawing on 350 years of colonial oppression, 
these activists did not prioritize the examination of the legacies of slavery within the framework 
of a Republican public debate, but rather aimed to achieve independence from this very 
Republic. By the later 1990s, however, the memory of slavery had resurfaced as a central 
feature of the relationship between the Republic and its ultramarin citizens, as both politicians 
and activists shifted their attention to influencing the French public debate and discourse. 
First Mobilizations
The discovery of the importance of slavery as a political issue for hexagonal Antilleans was 
aided by a group of Guadeloupian activists centred on the couple Serge and Viviane Romana. 
The Romanas, a surgeon and a psychoanalyst based in Paris, had become key organizational 
figures in the metropolitan-based independence movement of the island territory. However, by 
the mid-1990s, just as independentism in the DOMs was losing momentum, the Romanas opted 
to abandon the goal of independence in favour of reflection on the plight of Antillean 
communities in the metropole. They focused their attention on the disarray these communities 
faced, and especially on the discrepancy between their expectation of being accepted into 
society as equal French citizens and the discrimination they faced on the ground. French 
citizenship – rather than race – was key to understanding the Romanas’ shift from 
independentism to community organization and outreach.13 Instead of challenging 
discrimination as a problem shared by African-heritage communities across the board, the 
demands of the Romanas’ new activism centred on the value of their citizenship. For them, the 
historical bond between Antilleans and the Republic needed to be redefined and readapted to 
live up to its promise. 
Nonetheless, the Romanas’ transition between Guadeloupian independentism to a focus on 
equality under French sovereignty was not self-evident. It was the result of Viviane Romana’s 
work on “auto-psychoanalysis”, which she initially explored through exchange with mainly 
Jewish colleagues who worked on the role of collective trauma in shaping patterns of behaviour 
in affected families long after the event in question had taken place.14 This work on individual 
transmission of painful experiences focused on the root of Antillean identity’s emergence 
through slavery. According to this logic, the uniqueness of the Guadeloupian or Martiniquais 
condition could not be found in opposition to the French metropole, but rather through shared 
historical continuities in a society that had not existed prior to the enslavement of Africans. 
The Romanas concluded that unlike other colonial subjects, who could regain their dignity 
through the act of independence and detachment from the metropole, Antillean societies could 
not disentangle themselves from their “creators”. Instead, they needed to re-articulate their 
relationship with France in a way that acknowledged the painful history of slavery and the 
bonds that defined Antilleans as inherently French.  
For these ends, the Romanas founded the association Bwafouyé in 1994. Its manifesto focused 
mostly on the organization’s goal of confronting and making sense of the Antillean 
community’s painful past. As the organization’s name – Kreyol for “a tool for digging” – 
suggested, the Romanas’ main objective was to dig into the Antillean collective consciousness:
Parce que nous souffrons dans notre âme de la non-conscience du Sens de cette histoire 
tellement prégnante […]
Parce que nous pensons que notre existence et notre avenir sont liés à l'effort que nous 
ferons pour que vive notre passé, […] nous voulons FOUILLER :
- Fouyé notre propre histoire personnelle et [...] en faisant tout pour la comprendre et 
l'intégrer dans le mouvement historique général de notre société.15
The manifesto’s attempts to uncover the “origins” of members of the Antillean community 
reflected the association’s initial preoccupation with individual genealogical research. 
Nonetheless, the focus on the concept “devoir de mémoire” as the association’s primary goal 
and the manifesto’s title is especially telling. This term had first appeared in the 1970s in the 
context of mainly Jewish struggles to come to terms with France’s role in the Holocaust. In 
1992, it began to be used in official discourse as a reference to the French state’s duty to 
incorporate the memory of Vichy’s crimes against Jews into the Republic’s historical narrative. 
By the late 1990s, it had become ubiquitous in the popular discourse.16 In this instance, it 
highlighted the Romanas’ ambition to move beyond the level of the individual and the 
community towards the articulation of a national memory of slavery. Ultimately, 1998 offered 
an opportunity to make an impact on a national scale, as the government was preparing the 
commemoration of the 150th anniversary for the second abolition of slavery.
The Jospin government had decided to celebrate the 1998 anniversary as a gesture of good will 
towards the overseas departments and some of their MPs, who had previously called on the 
government to mark the occasion. As a sign of unity, the government planned the events as a 
Republican spectacle under the motto “tous nés en 1848”. A series of commemorations that 
began with a ceremony on 25 April 1998 in the Palais Bourbon was supposed to interpret the 
act of the abolition of slavery as a commitment to the values of the Republic: Liberty, Equality 
and Fraternity on the one hand, and a call for social cohesion on the other. Laurent Fabius, the 
president of the National Assembly spoke during a press conference that presented the 
programme. He declared that “ce fut bien le décret du 27 avril 1848 [the abolition decree] qui 
créa une rupture, répara une brisure et fit de notre pays un Etat de tous les citoyens ‘libres, 
égaux, fraternels’. C’est la France entière qui alors en fut grandie.”17 Catherine Trautman, the 
Minister of Culture, added that “cette année doit être considérée non pas comme une fin mais 
un commencement [...] Parce que ce n’est pas une année de célébration qui suffit à marquer 
l’héritage, à rattraper deux siècles d’oubli ou de mépris”.18 With the intention of appeasing 
Caribbean communities in France, government officials used the commemoration year to speak 
of the ubiquitous horror of slavery. Simultaneously, these declarations always ended with a 
focus on the need for Republican cohesion, embodied by the act of abolition. Despite a budding 
awareness of the importance of the topic for Caribbean communities in France, the government 
still framed slavery and abolition as parts of a Republican discourse that celebrated the 
greatness of the nation.
The plans for the commemoration of the anniversary with their focus on an abolitionist 
narrative pushed members of the Romanas’ association to act, as they were particularly 
outraged by the separation of the abolitionist Republic from the preceding “non-Republican” 
enslavement. They decided to mount a protest and plan an alternative commemoration with the 
support of the Guadeloupe-based lawyer and vice president of the Pointe à Pitre branch of the 
Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, Hubert Jabot. As a first step, they called for a unitary meeting 
with various Caribbean associations and community figures. According to Serge Romana, 
more than a hundred activists – with different goals and programmes – attended this new 
attempt to unite Antillean activists in the metropole. On 23 January 1998, the meeting turned 
into an emotional discussion that focused on how French history writing had prevented these 
activists from paying tribute to the memory of their – often nameless – slave forebears. At the 
end of the debate, they decided to organise a silent march to honour the memory of the dead, 
creating the unitary Caribbean network Comité pour une Commémoration Unitaire du Cent 
cinquantenaire de l’Abolition de l’Esclavage des Nègres dans les Colonies Françaises 
(CCUCAENCF).19
Subsequently, the main commemoration occurred on 23 May 1998. The date corresponded to 
the abolition of slavery in Martinique, where a slave revolt forced the governor to implement 
the abolition decree before its arrival. In this case, however, the date was chosen for reasons 
concerning organization and mobilization rather than symbolic value. On the morning of 23 
May, between 6,000 and 40,000 men and women20 – most of whom were of Caribbean origin 
– marched silently between République and Nation to show respect for the occasion “sans 
clamer des slogans, sans appeler à la vengeance”.21 They collected 10,000 signatures for a 
petition calling on the government to recognise slavery as a Crime against Humanity. Even 
though press coverage of the event remained minimal,22 the demonstration quickly became a 
symbol of the metropolitan Antillean community’s desire to “briser le silence” around the 
subject of slavery.23 
Legislative Measures: The Taubira Law and Its Aftermath
In March of the same year, Antillean Communist MPs began taking legislative initiatives to 
achieve state recognition of slavery as a Crime against Humanity. These legislative measures 
reacted to the visibility of the 1998 commemoration as well as the first attempts to mobilize 
the Antillean community. Simultaneously, however, as they considered ways to politicize the 
memory of slavery, Antillean activists and politicians reacted to the success of Jewish activists 
in pursuing state recognition for the Republic’s responsibility to the crimes perpetrated by the 
Vichy regime. While President Chirac’s 1995 declaration that “oui, la folie criminelle de 
l’occupant a été secondée par l’état français”24 marked the state’s official acknowledgement, 
it followed a lengthy trajectory in which Jewish activists needed to devise an arsenal of ways 
to challenge the state’s narrative and seek redress. For observers from other communities, the 
two most successful methods appeared to be the recourse to the courts and legislation. The 
former used the term Crime against Humanity in order to prosecute Vichy executives despite 
legal amnesties.25 Subsequently, the 1990 Gayssot Law that penalised “négationnisme” added 
another level of state recognition of the importance of the memory of the Holocaust.26 As 
Antillean politicians sought legal recognition of slavery as a Crime against Humanity, they 
sought to emulate Jewish success from a practical vantage point, if not also to seek “memorial 
parity” with another minority community.27 
For this end, three Communist bills, submitted between March and July 1998, picked up on 
different aspects of commemoration and legal action: the first to institutionalise the 1998 
commemorations in an annual memorial day,28 the second to commemorate slavery rather than 
its abolition together with the construction of a memorial,29 and the third to recognise 
transatlantic, colonial slavery as a Crime against Humanity.30 The Socialist majority rejected 
all three. However, the bills prompted the Jospin government to take action and appoint a 
special governmental mission to appease the “demandes ultra-marines” and to draft another 
bill that would eventually create a synthesis between the different elements of the Communist 
projects. Christiane Taubira, a young and energetic Guyanese former-independentist-turned-
Socialist, led this mission. Taubira had not previously campaigned for the memory of slavery. 
However, she later recalled that members of the Antillean community in France and in the 
DOMs convinced her of the importance of acknowledging slavery as a Crime against Humanity 
despite her “très fortes réticences et même [her] agacement du début”.31
Taubira presented the new bill to the Assemblée nationale on 18 February 1999. After several 
readings in both houses, its final version passed unanimously by the Sénat on 10 May 2001. 
The law that would come to be known as the Loi Taubira recognised the status of the 
transatlantic slave trade as a Crime against Humanity, stipulated that school curricula and 
research programmes “accorderont à la traite négrière et à l'esclavage la place conséquente 
qu'ils méritent”, called for adequate international cooperation on the issue of the 
commemoration of slavery and, lastly, prescribed the creation of an expert committee to 
institutionalise the commemoration of the slave trade and its abolitions.32 
The road to this unanimous vote reflected the growing acceptance of the French state’s 
involvement in matters of memory. At first, the preliminary commission debates painted a 
picture of a political class that was ready to acknowledge the horrors of the act of enslavement, 
but simultaneously rejected the necessity of this legislative process.33 Taubira recalled that her 
own party members had approached her to dilute the bill’s contents into a single article of 
official acknowledgement devoid of its educational aspects. However, in these instances the 
Guyanese MP, who had been introduced to the concept of devoir de mémoire only shortly 
beforehand, realised this popular expression provided her with a way forward. As she 
appropriated it, Taubira managed to convince fellow politicians of the need to embrace this 
legislative measure as a Republican duty towards Antillean citizens. Subsequently, the debate 
in the National Assembly on 18 February 1999 showed Taubira’s strategy had born fruit. 
Nearly all deputés seized the opportunity to denounce the nastiness of the slave trade, show 
indignation at the suffering of the victims of the slave trade and provide at least one quote from 
a great Enlightenment thinker, preferably Condorcet.34 They presented the law as the latest, 
most appropriate act of a national “devoir de mémoire”, a legislative way to fight against 
popular forgetfulness. Georges Sarre, the Socialist mayor of Paris’s 11th arrondissement 
bemoaned: 
Je regrette que, dans les moments où les Françaises et les Français sont unanimes à 
condamner l’esclavage […] il n’y ait pas dans l’hémicycle ce sentiment qu’il est en effet 
nécessaire de regarder le passé, de condamner ce qui doit être condamné, pour mieux servir 
le présent et, en particulier, travailler en faveur de la citoyenneté.35
In the same vein, Christiane Taubira spoke of this act of memorial legislation as the only 
acceptable link between the state and the people and therefore the only possible act of moral 
reparation: 
Nous sommes là pour dire que la traite et l’esclavage furent et sont un crime contre 
l’humanité […] qu’il est juste d’énoncer que c’est dans nos idéaux de justice, de fraternité, 
de solidarité, que nous puisons les raisons de dire que le crime doit être qualifié. Et inscrit 
dans la loi parce que la loi seule dira la parole solennelle au nom du peuple français. Cette 
inscription dans la loi, cette parole forte, sans ambiguïté, cette parole officielle et durable 
constitue une réparation symbolique...36
During this phase, the subject of slavery was seen as a rallying cry for the Republic from all 
sides of the political spectrum. Members of all parties thought a positive reaction to ultramarin 
initiatives to recognize the slave trade as a Crime against Humanity represented minimal 
political risk. This recognition portrayed the Republic as inclusive of all its citizens by breaking 
a century of silence. Yet as much as the speakers engaged with accepting French responsibility 
for the slave trade,37 they did not go as far as to include the subject of reparations within the 
parameters of the law. Furthermore, the most striking element of the debate was how the 
députés framed the debate around notions of the Republic as the pays des Droits de l’Homme. 
Here, the pre-Republican character of the slave trade, abolished with the proclamation of the 
Second Republic, meant that slavery was beyond Republican temporality and could not be seen 
as a dark stain on Republican institutions. This facilitated the official recognition of the slave 
trade as a Crime against Humanity within a self-proclaimed tradition of Republican 
benevolence. 
Finding a Memorial Day
Article 4 of the Taubira Law called for the creation of a “comité de personnalités qualifiées, 
parmi lesquelles des représentants d'associations défendant la mémoire des esclaves, chargé 
de proposer, sur l'ensemble du territoire national, des lieux et des actions qui garantissent la 
pérennité de la mémoire de ce crime à travers les générations”.38 The cohabitation government 
did not take any steps toward the creation of this committee before the 2002 elections, and 
Chirac’s UMP government waited for more than a year before taking action. In January 2004, 
Overseas Minister Brigitte Girardin announced she had begun assembling the Comité pour la 
mémoire de l’esclavage (CPME) under the directorship of the novelist Maryse Condé.39 It was 
composed of 12 members, mostly high-profile academics like the vice president Françoise 
Vergès and Nelly Schmidt, but also members of associations. These included Henriette Dorion-
Sébéloué, president of the Union des Guyanais et des amis de la Guyane, and most notably 
Serge Romana. The latter had by that time established his reputation as the grass-roots authority 
on memory after founding the association Comité de marche 98 (CM98) in order to continue 
what had been started with the unexpected success of the protest against the government’s 
commemoration. The committee’s first mission was to produce a report about the different 
aspects of the institutionalization of the commemoration of slavery. It included an evaluation 
of popular awareness of the history of slavery in 2005 as well as proposals in the fields of 
education, research and culture. Finally, and most important, the CPME was commissioned to 
propose a date for a national commemoration day of slavery and its abolitions. Françoise 
Vergès recalled that
on a fait un énorme travail en 2004. [...] On a fait un bilan de ce qui existait [...]. On a vu 
dans l’enseignement: pas grand-chose. Dans la recherche? Pas grand-chose et dans la 
culture? Pas grand-chose non plus. [...] Il y avait eu quelques expositions ou des choses 
comme ça, mais au niveau de l’état, au niveau gouvernemental - et en France ça compte 
beaucoup - pas grand-chose.40
On 12 April 2005, the CPME submitted its first report, which contained an analysis of the main 
challenges facing the commemoration of the slave trade in France. As a starting point, Maryse 
Condé’s introduction framed the necessity of initiating state commemoration and promoting 
education about the slave trade in terms of the expectations and demands made by French 
citizens issus de l’esclavage: 
il existe une forte attente, au-delà de tous les clivages, pour un acte symbolique fort et pour 
des actions concrètes de la part des plus hautes autorités de la République française […]. 
Cette attente s’explique par le fait que la très grande majorité de nos concitoyens du monde 
issu de l’esclavage sont convaincus que, malgré la loi du 21 mai 2001, l’histoire de la traite 
négrière, de l’esclavage et de leurs abolitions continue d’être largement ignorée, négligée, 
marginalisée. Ces concitoyens perçoivent cet état de fait comme un déni de leur propre 
existence et de leur intégration dans la République.41
The report identified the main problem – and with it also the main goals of commemoration – 
as one of knowledge, or lack thereof. In this vein, the CPME’s focus with regard to the fields 
of popular culture and education was not to appease communities issues de l’esclavage, but to 
overcome ignorance and promote citoyenneté through the dissemination of knowledge to 
French society at large.42 To achieve this aim, the main problem that needed to be overcome 
was not “silence”, but indifference and the fact that
rares sont les Français qui savent que, pendant près de quatre siècles, leur pays fut une 
grande puissance esclavagiste […] que la plantation ne fut pas une particularité de 
l’économie américaine, que le Code Noir – qui définit l’être humain asservi comme un 
simple « meuble » – fut une création du droit français, qu’il fallut deux abolitions (1794 et 
1848) pour mettre fin à ce système, et, enfin, que leur nation compte en son sein, aujourd’hui 
même, des descendants d’esclaves.43
The biggest impact of the CPME’s report was the choice of 10 May as the date for France’s 
new national commemoration day. To reach this decision, the committee made a list of possible 
dates and examined whether any of them could be imbued with enough symbolic value to be 
both evocative and consensual at the same time. Furthermore, such a date needed to relate – at 
least loosely – to aspects of both the history of the slave trade and its abolitions and prompt 
national consensus, while avoiding being too closely connected to any single community or 
region.44 
The CPME found the two first obvious dates, those of the two abolitions of slavery in France, 
symbolically problematic, as the choice of any abolition date would have perpetuated an 
abolitionist narrative that overshadowed the motivation of commemorating the crime of the 
transatlantic slave trade. In particular, members of associations involved in the debates of the 
committee were most strongly opposed to the choice of 27 April, the date of the second 
abolition, as it was “à la fois date d’émancipation et de perpétuation d’un système 
colonialiste”. In addition, they deplored that “le culte ultérieur de Schoelcher, qui a transformé 
le grand abolitionniste en personnage paternaliste, a fini par occulter la portée émancipatrice 
de son action”.45
The CPME struggled just as much with other, less obvious dates. 23 August, the beginning of 
the Haitian Revolution, was discarded as it fell in the middle of the school holidays. 10 May, 
the date that eventually became France’s national commemoration day, was not initially 
included in the list of possible dates. Françoise Vergès recalled that it was only during her 
interview with Christiane Taubira that the parliamentarian proposed adopting 10 May, as it was 
a day in which “les Elus de la République ont adopté à l’unanimité une loi historique et 
universelle à la fois”.46 The members of the committee were convinced of the merits of 
adopting a date that symbolized the Republic’s recognition of the crime as well as the struggle 
of descendants of slaves to make their voices heard. Taubira’s suggestion enabled the 
committee to invent an act of consensual commemoration. While it was stately and Republican 
in character – as it celebrated the Republic’s recognition of its duty to the Rights of Man, it 
also claimed the mantel of radicalism as the result of an ultramarin struggle against the 
structures of the Republic.
Nonetheless, the committee’s search for a Republican consensus did not come without 
casualties. Its biggest conflict followed Serge Romana’s suggestion to celebrate 23 May, or 
date of the 1998 marche silencieuse, and thus officially acknowledge the national importance 
of this act of popular Antillean mobilization. Morever, since 1999, Romana’s organization 
CM98 had organised protest marches to commemorate slavery every 23 May, an event which 
had de facto turned into the first annual organised commemoration of slavery in Greater Paris. 
The CPME rejected Romana’s suggestion to institutionnalise CM98’s tradition as “cette date, 
fortement associée au travail d’associations principalement antillaises, n’avait pas acquis une 
portée universelle”.47 As a result, Romana resigned from the committee and promptly severed 
all ties between associations related to CM98 and government initiatives.48 In the short term, 
this conflict prompted the emergence of two competing commemorations of slavery and its 
abolition. The continued rivalry between 10 May and 23 May reflected tensions between two 
perceptions of the purpose of commemoration. On the one hand, 10 May represented the 
Republican appropriation of slavery within a narrative of Devoir de mémoire. On the other, 
however, 23 May embodied CM98’s narrative that perceived the commemoration of slavery 
as an act of resistance to Republican paternalism and an attempt to acknowledge a Caribbean 
voice. These two competing narratives informed the debates around the commemoration of the 
first Journée nationale des mémoires de la traite, de l’esclavage et de leurs abolitions on 10 
May 2006. 
For the official commemoration of 10 May, the test was whether the programme devised by 
the CPME – which in 2006 was re-launched under the new name Comité pour la mémoire et 
l’histoire de l’esclavage (CPMHE) – could be memorable enough to imbue the date with 
enough meaning for a national audience that did not necessarily think of slavery and its 
abolitions as key events in French history. In this vein, the main event took place at the Jardin 
du Luxembourg in the presence of President Chirac, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin 
and the Presidents of the Sénat and the Assemblée nationale, and bore the mark of a classically 
Republican ceremony. It began with expected tributes to Caribbean culture – in form of 
readings of Aimé Césaire and performances by contemporary Antillean artists – and 
culminated with a presidential speech.49 Chirac’s speech placed the commemoration of slavery 
and its abolitions within a quintessentially Republican tradition. First, it stressed the connection 
between Republicanism and abolition in concluding that “la République est née avec le combat 
contre l’esclavage. 1794, 1848: la République, c’est l’abolition”.50 Secondly and just as 
importantly, it referred to a trajectory of “coming to terms with the past” that strengthened 
France’s national cohesion. In so doing, Chirac appropriated the recognition of France’s 
responsibility for the crime of slavery as part and parcel of a national project that stressed 
elements of common Republican “citoyenneté” rather than the image of slavery as a history 
that belonged first and foremost to France’s Antillean community. 
Ultimately, this act of official recognition was widely covered by the media as “history in the 
making” and – even more than the Taubira Law – attracted the attention of men and women 
who had previously not been involved in the nascent debate. Particularly the criticism from the 
ranks of the conservative Right highlighted some of the obstacles standing in the way of 
incorporating slavery – and not just its abolitions – into the national narrative. These often took 
one of two forms: fear of the spectre of “communautarisme” or outrage at this sign of state 
“repentance”. 
The rejection of so-called repentance was most evident in the Speech of the then Interior 
Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, who spent 10 May at a UMP conference in Nimes where he called 
on his audience to “refuser qu’on fasse de l’esclavage l’unique visage de la France”.51 The 
editorial of the conservative Le Figaro warned of a similar danger as “l’opinion risque ainsi 
d’être plongée dans un bain de confusion et de dériver entre repentance et ressentiment”.52 
These comments did not refer to any apologies that were incorporated into the 
commemorational programme, as there were none. On the other hand, they attacked the notion 
of memory politics as means for the state to prioritize acknowledgement of the country’s dark 
past over the focus on more traditional tropes of national grandeur. The focus on 
Communautarisme reflected the traditional case against any group particularism in France’s 
supposedly colour-blind Republican system.53 As comments like the Overseas Minister 
François Baroin’s about the danger of “se servir de l’histoire de la servitude comme prétexte 
au communautarisme”54 demonstrated, there was no consensus that the acknowledgement of 
France’s responsibility for slavery would reassert its national cohesion. Indeed, for many 
political actors – especially, but not only, on the right – the main issue with the commemoration 
was whether it contributed to strengthening the “indivisibility” of the Republic or whether the 
acknowledgement of slavery as a particularly French responsibility weakened the Republican 
national project. 
10 May and Black Activism
Simultaneously, the first 10 May commemoration provided an opportunity for Afro-Caribbean 
activists to re-articulate a black identity that focused on a changing relationship with the state. 
While Antillean activists associated with the Romanas ignored the new memorial day 
altogether, coalitions of Afro-Caribbean activists picked up the gauntlet to challenge the state’s 
monopoly on the event. Here, for the first time since the heyday of Pan-Africanism in the early 
1950s, the articulation of the memory of slavery became a defining element of a nascent black 
French activism. Indeed, the notion of “blackness” in France had evolved differently from those 
in Britain or the US, both due to Republican ideas of supposed colour-blindness and rifts 
between African and Antillean communities in France.55 In particular, African and Antillean 
activists focused on different issues for a long period of time, as their citizenship status 
influenced their expectations from the French Republic, their relations with republican 
institutions and their opportunities for dissent. Simultaneously, when Antillean activists and 
politicians discovered the political potential of mobilizing the memory of slavery, they mostly 
rejected any African involvement. Not only did Caribbean activists consider slavery a historical 
burden that their African peers did not share, but they also perceived contemporary Africans 
as the descendants of men and women who had sold their brothers and sisters to slavery in the 
first place. By 2006, however, a different kind of black activism had been brewing. A new 
generation of activists began appropriating the memory of slavery as a means of speaking to 
France’s black constituency and to define its place in within French society. 
The most notable appearance of black activism happened in December 2005 through the 
founding of the Conseil représentatif des associations noires (CRAN), the first national 
umbrella organization of Afro-Caribbean activists.56 In a move that was deemed innovative, 
the CRAN sought to underline the problems “qui ne font pas de subtilités entre les noirs de 
Guyane, les noirs du Bénin et les noirs de la Réunion”,57 yet it wanted to do so through 
cooperation with the structures of the Republic. In the early phases of its existence, the CRAN’s 
first president, the UDF member Patrick Lozès, focused the organization’s strategy on 
conducting ethnic statistics to show that the politics of diversity and representation were 
compatible with Republican principles of national cohesion.58 The memory of slavery was not 
featured on the CRAN’s list of priorities, particularly because the recent achievements of 
Antillean activists and politicians had not left the organization much space in which to operate. 
To show their willingness to work with the government and unite black communities, the 
CRAN’s activists attended the 10 May commemoration.59 The CRAN, however, showed that  
it was not entirely convinced by the government’s appropriation of 10 May. The organization’s 
then-spokesperson, Louis-Georges Tin, spoke of a “rendez-vous manqué avec l’histoire”60 as 
the government’s monopoly over the planning of the event did not engage associations that 
wished to contribute. As a result, Tin noted, the commemoration did not fulfil the black 
community’s expectations of increased participation after the Taubira Law, but rather sowed 
division between activists and the state.
Simultaneously, other black activists identified an opportunity to formulate a contemporary 
black identity through resistance to the symbols of the Republic. For them, 10 May 2006 came 
conveniently after a year that saw a continuous debate about “colonial continuities” and their 
impact on contemporary French society. Through a sequence of events - between the founding 
of the organization Les Indigènes de la République with its battle cry to “decolonize the 
Republic”,61 the November riots with the debate about the impact of colonial legacies on 
contemporary problems in the suburbs, and lastly the debate on the 23 February Law on the 
“positive role” of French colonialism62 - the French public conversation seemed to open up for 
men and women who wanted to invoke racial questions through historical connections. In this 
context, another initiative launched by the author Claude Ribbe, Collectif pour l’Organisation 
d’un 10 mai républicain et de recueillement, organized an alternative event on 10 May. The 
invitation and the programme circulated on all major radical left-wing, Muslim and African 
websites in France including lesogres.org, oumma.com or afrikara.com, and announced a 
conference at the Bourse de travail at République followed by a march towards Place de la 
Nation. The event’s goal was to recreate a narrative of resistance in the same vein as the march 
of 23 May 1998, but this time for a black rather than Antillean community. 
Similar to 1998, Claude Ribbe and the organizers of the 10 May event approached their 
audience as a group of “descendants d’esclaves”. Yet, while in 1998 the Romanas used 
genealogical research as a starting point for their activism, in 2006 the term “descendants of 
slaves” did not apply to historical continuity. Interestingly, as Ribbe spoke of “real descendants 
of slaves”, he evoked a group defined through resistance to a Republican establishment rather 
than connection to family history. For Ribbe, the “vrais descendants d’esclaves” were “ceux 
qui ne reçoivent pas de cartons d’invitation pour aller faire des ronds de jambes dans des 
ministères, à ceux qui ne parlent pas au nom des autres, à ceux qui ne comptent pas pour les 
décideurs et les puissants, mais qui ont une envie sincère de rendre hommage à leurs 
ancêtres”.63 Here, the right to address a lineage to the enslaved became entangled with a 
political identity of activists who challenged Republican “decision makers” and were not 
tempted by the privilege of power. 
The alternative 10 May protest, which remained a fairly small event,64 did not cultivate a myth 
of political mobilization like 23 May 1998. It did, however, unite men and women from very 
different sides of the black cultural elite. Participants included on the one hand some of the 
more “Republican” figures of France’s black community such as actress Joby Valente, author 
Calixthe Beyala and radio station owner and Délégué interministériel pour l'égalité des 
chances des Français d'Outre-mer Claudy Siar. The latter had spoken of the importance of 
marking 10 May in a respectable way to show an alternative to Sarkozy, de Villiers and Le 
Pen.65 On the other hand, the most memorable appearance at the event was assigned to the 
comedian Dieudonné, who – after he had tried to interrupt the official ceremony at the 
Luxembourg – came to show solidarity to the alternative event together with a group of 
supporters. 
Dieudonné’s increased attention to the memory of slavery in the previous years was at odds 
with Siar’s desire for respectability and inclusion. Since 2002, the mixed-race comedian of 
Breton and Cameroonian descent, who was previously known for his anti-racist credentials and 
mediatized campaigns against the Front national, had rebranded himself through his newly-
found “anti-Zionist” fervour. His interventions repeatedly targeted Jewish symbols, most often 
the memory of the Holocaust in France, and portrayed Jews as interlocked in a historical battle 
against blacks in France. By 2005, his interventions had become often quoted in the press and 
usually attracted far more public attention than the enactment of the Taubira Law and its 
aftermath. One such claim was that “c’est quand même amusant de voir à quel point le pouvoir 
sioniste en France va jusqu’à priver une partie de la population du devoir de la mémoire. Les 
juifs ont souffert moins que les Noirs, On ne parle que des chambres à gaz, mais les Noirs ont 
été jetés vivants à la mer”.66 Here, Dieudonné presented his increasingly popular rants as acts 
of resistance against a Republican establishment that prioritised the Jewish memory of the 
Holocaust over the black memory of slavery. In so doing, he defined the relations between 
blackness and the memory of slavery in the public eye in much the same way as Ribbe did: it 
was not the result of clear historical continuities, but of the mobilization of a vocabulary of 
historical references to challenge the Republic. Indeed, when the half-Cameroonian Dieudonné 
spoke for descendants of slaves, he did not do so because he could claim that he had descended 
from enslaved Africans. He appropriated the right do so as a means of slaughtering what he – 
and many of his supporters – perceived as a Republican “holy cow”. 
Ultimately, the convergence of such different characters in one small event on 10 May 2006 
does not suggest that they all shared the same vision of blackness or of the commemoration of 
slavery and its abolitions. Far more tellingly, it is but a snippet, a miniature window into the 
way a new generation of activists articulated blackness in 2006. Here, appropriating the 
memory of slavery provided an opportunity to define a community through the theme of 
resistance to the state rather than the CRAN’s focus on police violence or ethnic statistics. 
Simultaneously, however, this interpretation of resistance had its limits. Firstly, it did not 
bridge gaps between African and Antillean communities, as ultramarin groups affiliated with 
the Romanas’ CM98 had their own relationship with the state. They did not prioritize resistance 
as such, but demanded recognition as French citizens with a particular history that was not 
shared by Africans. Secondly, challenging the state over the 10 May commemoration was 
difficult, as this represented a moment in which the Republic had acknowledged the importance 
of the history of slavery within its national narrative. Although the theme of resistance had 
helped expose inconsistencies within the Republican discourse that the commemoration had 
strengthened, it did not actually call the dominance of Republican structures into question. 
Nonetheless, Afro-Caribbean activists who wanted their voices to be heard could not forego 10 
May 2006 as an opportunity for symbolic protest. As the first such anniversary, it was a rare 
moment where the media focused its attention on issues relevant to France’s Afro-Caribbean 
communities, while the attention given to Dieudonné and the 2005 controversies over the 23 
February Law on colonialism had already sensitized the public to such debates. Indeed, public 
attention to 10 May would later diminish as its novelty value subsided. 
Conclusion
The period between 1998 and 2006 saw the transformation of the French state’s relationship 
with the memory and history of enslavement and its abolitions. Indeed, in the mid-1990s, 
metropolitan Republican actors paid little attention to the role of slavery in French history. 
Engagement with the importance of slavery was confined to the DOMs, both within state 
mechanisms invested in perpetuating an abolitionist narrative and local activism that tried to 
challenge it. By 2006, however, the French Republic had legislated to recognise transatlantic 
slavery as a Crime against Humanity and instituted a national memorial day to commemorate 
both the victims of historical enslavement and the tumultuous road to abolition. Even though 
this happened in less than a decade, the process in which the Republic “came to terms” with 
the memory of slavery was by no means linear and self-evident. 
While there were metropolitan initiatives that had focused on the memory of slavery before 
1998, the main impulse to initiate a national debate in France came from Antillean activism in 
the hexagon. In particular, the shift from independentism to a search for ways to articulate a 
new link between Antillean citizens and the Republic led activists to explore the history of 
enslavement as the source of their French citizenship. As they followed the example of Jewish 
memory activism to demand their voice within Republican structures, the focus on the 
articulation of a new memory culture became a way to access a new sense of citoyenneté. The 
success of Christiane Taubira and other ultramarin MPs in turning this initial impulse into 
legislation owed much to their success in formulating the demand of recognition through the 
emerging political vocabulary of “devoir de mémoire”. From the vantage point of French 
legislators, the debates that followed, most notably instituting a memorial day on 10 May of 
each year, contributed to the inclusion of France’s Antillean communities into this memory 
discourse in order to reaffirm their symbolic bonds to the Republic. 
However, the conflicts that arose from the creation of 10 May demonstrated the limits of the 
symbolic achievement of the Taubira Law. Firstly, the rift between the Romanas’ CM98 and 
the CPMHE revealed the reluctance of many French Antilleans to accept a commemoration 
that could be interpreted as Republican self-glorification. For Serge Romana, the rejection of 
23 May, a date of Antillean resistance in Paris, in favour of a celebration of Republican 
benevolence seemed like a case of Republican paternalism. Moreover, it failed to acknowledge 
the meaning of such a commemoration for the Antillean community. On the other hand, 
reactions of organizations and individuals invested in speaking for a “black” community 
revealed another kind of unease with the celebration of 10 May. These men and women wished 
to re-appropriate the memory of slavery from a specifically ultramarin community for the sake 
of the articulation of a black identity that corresponded with lived realities in 21st-century 
France. Nonetheless, blackness had often been defined less through references to Pan-
Africanism and more through resistance to police violence and racism, which the official 
commemoration of slavery and its abolitions did not seem to change.
Ultimately, the process in which the French Republic embraced a state memory of transatlantic 
slavery was part of a larger context of the politicization of memory in France. For activists, this 
meant that they approached memory not for the sake of the mechanics of commemoration, but 
to address their place in French society. In so doing, they operated within the broader context 
of race relations and reacted not only to what many saw as the success of Jewish activism in 
creating a state memory of the Shoah, but also to wider developments such as the growing 
visibility of the Algerian War of Independence and the controversy over the 23 February Law 
in 2005. Especially for black activists who tried to challenge what they saw as the state’s 
hegemony over the 10 May commemoration, memory provided a useful vocabulary to 
challenge discrimination. Nonetheless, as confusion over concepts of “resistance” showed, this 
vocabulary was limited in what it could achieve in terms of tackling discrimination on the 
ground. In 2006, activists were confronted with the necessity of translating symbolic 
achievements into more tangible anti-racism, as focus on memory often exacerbated problems 
rather than offered remedies.   
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